We investigate the time varying dynamics of the linkages between sovereign and bank default risks over the period 2006-2015, using Jel Classification E43, E52, F36, C32
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007 triggered a series of spillover effects between the banking and the sovereign sectors both within countries and across borders. In this context, the word nexus has often been used to define the link between the default risk of sovereign and the default risk of banks or, in some cases, the reverse. Given the critical implications of these phenomena, the comprehension of how sectorial conditions are transmitted and of how sovereign and bank risk feedback loops operate is of paramount importance for both policymakers and regulators.
In this paper we document the time varying dynamics of the linkages between sovereign and bank default risks over the period 2006-2015. We use the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of the bonds of major international banks and of sovereign issuers as indicators of bank and sovereign default risk respectively.
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Several papers provide evidence and explanation of the different channels through which bank risk may impinge on sovereign risk and vice versa.
Recently Acharya et al. (2015) , De Bruyckere et al. (2013) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016) analyze theoretically and empirically the feedback loops between sovereign risk and bank risk considering both domestic and non-domestic counterparties. The direction of causality can run from bank to sovereign risk in countries with sound public finances where taxpayers may be asked to back up banks in distress, or the other way around, i.e. from sovereign to banks when a fragile public sector may affect both asset and liability sides of banks' balance sheets. Whatever the cause and the direction of the spillover there are factors that tend to bolster the feedback loop. In order to break this loop and to reduce the degree of correlation we must understand the structure and the dynamics of these linkages. Angelini et al. (2014) assess the impact of sovereign risk on bank risk and investigate the interconnections between sovereigns and banks by 1 CDS are swap agreements that represent insurance contracts in which the protection buyer pays a regular insurance premium, the CDS spread, which is typically denoted in annualized basis points of the insured notional. If a credit event occurs, i.e. a sovereign or a bank default, the protection buyer is entitled to receive compensation for the incurred loss from the protection seller. measuring the size of assets and liabilities in a bank balance sheet. Gennaioli et al. (2014) offer theoretical and empirical evidence of the transmission of a sovereign debt crisis to the banking system and to the real economy via the banks' holdings of sovereign debt (assets side). An increase or a decrease in the fragility of the sovereign sector may affect its creditworthiness. This alters both the market price of the public debtcausing either a loss or a gain in the banks' portfolio of sovereign securities -and the value of banks' credit portfolios, depending on their exposure to government loans. The overall effect depends on the degree of portfolio diversification since home biases strengthen the "within country" nexus. This phenomenon might also be enhanced by the current regulation which gives a preferential treatment to public securities in terms either of reduced risk weights and concentration limits, or of their use for collateral purposes. As for liabilities, in response to the 2008 financial crisis, several governments provided explicit guarantees to bank bond issuers as a means to restore the functioning of the wholesale funding market. If a negative shock, such as a sovereign downgrade, reduces the value of the guarantees then funding will be more costly (Panetta, 2011) . This increase will be passed on to the yield curve with effects on credit availability and on economic growth, determining spillovers on credit quality and thus on the default probability of banks.
Furthermore the sovereign rating is a ceiling for private issuers. Hence a sovereign downgrade affects the funding market also by directly increasing the cost of funding of the issuer or reducing the available liquidity. Finally, as seen in 2008, financial distress may transfer to the sovereign when a government is asked to finance the bailout of troubled banks. The rescue measures may well increase the fiscal burden above or near sustainability level.
Apart from the domestic sectorial nexus, recent evidence points to the impact of cross-border linkages in transmitting national banking distress.
Shocks could occur between bank risks across different countries due to counterparty risk and to information contagion (Lang and Stulz, 1992 , Jorion and Zhang, 2007 , 2009 . Alternatively there could be interdependence between sovereign risks across different countries due to information contagion and/or explicit/implicit guarantees (see Lucas et al., 2014 , Benzoni et al., 2015 , Augustin et al., 2016 , Kallestrup et al., 2016 .
We also consider a third kind of cross border contagion, characterized by a sharp increase in the interdependence or co-movement between financial sectors of differing countries (e.g. linkages between sovereign risk in one country and bank risk in an another country). This kind of contagion could be triggered by the likelihood of insolvency of sovereigns if their obligations constitute a significant share of foreign bank portfolios. The spillover can be due to foreign borrowing or lending exposures in the banking sector and be triggered either by systemic or by idiosyncratic factors (see Tonzer, 2015, and Ballester et al., 2016) . Kallestrup et al. (2016) show that the size and riskiness of foreign asset holdings of the largest banks are an important determinant, not only of their own CDS premiums, but also of the CDS premiums of the sovereign in which the banks reside. Breckenfelder and Schwaab (2015) analyze risk contagion from the banking to the sovereign sectors across borders of the euro area on the basis of the results of the Comprehensive Assessment 2014 (CA 2014). They find that changes in CDS spreads in "non-stressed" countries become more sensitive (during crises) to the equity values of banks located in "stressed" countries. Thus, there is a risk perception connectedness in the Euro area through which bank risk shocks in one country can affect the credit risk of other sovereigns. From an empirical point of view, analyses of the nexus based on standard econometric models, which assume a priori causality hypotheses, may be distorted during financial upheavals since the very direction of causality is likely to change. We preferred, therefore, to avoid a priori commitments and base our analysis on correlations. However, as is well known from the literature on financial contagion (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002 , among many others) unconditional correlation analysis is distorted in the presence of volatility shifts.
Our empirical analysis is based on an accurate investigation of the dynamics of conditional correlations. The standard Constant Conditional Correlation GARCH (CCC-GARCH) procedure of Bollerslev (1990) is too restrictive and may provide biased estimates in the periods of severe financial disruption analyzed in this paper. We decided to discard it.
Interesting improvements can be found in Tse and Tsui (2002) and in Engle (2002) , where the conditional correlation itself is assumed to be time-varying. These studies, however, do not account for the regime shifts that constitute a stylized aspect of the recent financial contagion events. In this paper conditional correlations are parameterized with the help of a regime switching model, the Smooth Transmission Constant Correlation GARCH (STCC-GARCH) set out by Berben and Jansen (2005) and Terӓsvirta (2005, 2007) . This procedure is used to investigate the time-varying and regime-switching behavior of the conditional correlations between European bank and sovereign bond CDS daily rates of change over the 2006-2015 time interval.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. Firstly, focusing on correlations we abstract from the causality direction (which is both empirically and theoretically mostly bidirectional). Secondly, we add to the extant literature of cross border linkages by analyzing the nexus between bank risk in core countries and sovereign risk of peripheral countries under the hypothesis that higher bond yields and preferential treatment of bond issued by euro sovereigns under Basle II could have favored the stocking of peripheral sovereign bonds in core bank portfolios. Thirdly, we implement a state of the art time-varying regime switching correlation analysis, the STCC-GARCH, that allows both to identify the economic variable behind the state shifts, the so-called "transition variable", and to date precisely the changes in the size of the correlations that are due to shocks (viz. the Lehman crisis, the evolution of the Greek crisis, the CA 2014 announcements) or to unconventional policy actions such as the Quantitative Easing and the TLTRO. The effect of the latter on the strength of the nexus is implicitly a way of gauging the effectiveness of the specific instrument.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we explain our empirical methodology based on the smooth transition conditional correlations approach. Section 3 presents an overview of the data. This is followed in Section 4 by a discussion of the main results of the within country analysis. Cross country evidence on the nexus can be found in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.
The STCC-GARCH parameterization of time-varying correlations
Consider a Nx1 vector of CDS daily rates of change, with the following conditional mean dynamics
where A(L) is an autoregressive NxN polynomial lag matrix, µ a Nx1
vector of constants and a Nx1 vector of residuals such that
where −1 is the relevant information set. The conditional variance matrix of the residuals has the following time- Bollerslev (1990) posits in the CCC-GARCH parameterization that the conditional variance of each residual time series , = 1, … , , follows a GARCH(1,1) process and that the correlations are constant. The conditional second moments are thus modeled as
Denoting as a NxN diagonal matrix with diagonal elements given by 
Berben and Jansen (2005) and Silvennoinen and Terӓsvirta (2005) generalize the CCC-GARCH model and allow for smoothly time-varying conditional correlations. The latter are assumed to switch over time from one (extreme) constant correlation regime to the other, according to the distance from a threshold value of an ad hoc transition variable. The dynamics of the shifts are driven by a continuous logistic function.
The time t NxN conditional correlation matrix can be written as
Where 1 and 2 are assumed to be constant NxN positive definite correlation matrices. The logistic function is defined as
− is the transition variable with delay d and the coefficient γ and the threshold c determine, respectively, the speed of adjustment and the location of the transition between the two regimes.
is a mixture of the two correlation matrices 1 and 2 . When ( − − ) is large and positive, is close to 1 and nears 2 , and when ( − − ) is large and negative, is close to 0, and nears 1 .
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In order to justify the use of a nonlinear time-varying parameter model of this kind, we implement, among others, the Lagrange Multiplier test set out by Tse (2000) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) , extending the Taylor-expansion procedure originally set out in Luukkonen et al. (1988) . The link between bank and sovereign sectors could run both ways.
Negative shocks to the banking sector (i.e. an increase of its default risk)
could affect the default probability of the sovereign if the latter is expected to provide guarantees and financial aid to banks. Negative shocks to the sovereign debt sustainability could affect the asset value of banks according to the composition of their portfolios. Indeed, the sovereign bank nexus is strictly associated to the exposure of domestic bank portfolios to the domestic public debt, a portfolio structure frequently chosen before the inception of the European crises and, in some cases, even after. In table A.2 the Granger causality tests indicate that the causality between domestic banks and domestic sovereign runs both ways for France, Italy and Spain while it goes one way (from banks to sovereign) for Germany. Not a surprising result as Italian, Spanish and 4 Throughout the paper is assumed to be the rate of change of the variable and ∆ is assumed to be its change (first difference). 5 Overall, the selected countries account for 76% of the GDP of the EMU. As for the net debt to GDP ratio, in 2015 Italy has the largest one (113%) after Greece. The remaining countries follow with 89% (France), 65% (Spain) and 48% (Germany). (Source IMF WEO October 2015 data base.) 6 The selected banks are Société Générale, BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole in the case of France; Commerzbank, Deutche Bank and ING (the Netherlands), in the case of Germany; Intesa Sanpaolo, Unicredit and MPS for Italy and finally Santander, BBVA and Caixa for Spain. The data source is Bloomberg.
French banks were more exposed to domestic risky assets whereas German bunds were considered a safe haven. This picture is coherent with data computed by other researchers. Beltratti and Stulz (2015) find that the Italian and Spanish banks hold large amounts of bonds issued by their national governments, up to 169% and 125%, respectively, of their tangible equity, well above the percentage of domestic bond owned on average by core countries (33%).
7 Figure 1 shows that, within each country, bank and sovereign CDS tend to co-move tightly, with an average moving correlation of around 40%.
These correlations display common features across the selected countries. 
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
The pairwise correlation analysis of Table A .3 shows that the sovereign bank risk nexus significantly increases during crises and decreases after September 2012, when the ECB announced a new bond buying plan. In the case of Spain -the only exception to this pattern -a possible explanation, set out by Angelini et al. (2014) , is that the turmoil originated in the banking and not in the sovereign sector, reducing in this way the impact of the unconventional monetary tools. 8 Moreover, the exposure of the EU banking sectors to highly indebted peripheral sovereign countries could also be a powerful mean to transmit turbulences across countries, according to the nexus paradigm. Using BIS 7 See Beltratti and Stultz (2015, table 1, page 27) . 8 The Spanish sovereign bank nexus behaves differently also in other empirical studies. Stanga (2014) finds, using a structural VAR, that bail-out shocks and sovereign shocks affect Spanish banks CDS permanently, whereas the effects are temporary in the case of Italy, France and Germany. data, Korte and Steffen (2015) find that the banking sector non-domestic exposure to all EU sovereign bonds in terms of GDP is rather homogeneous across countries, 5.4% and 6.6%, for Italy and Spain, and 5.3% and 11.7%, respectively, for Germany and France. Not so for the non-domestic exposure to peripheral EU sovereign bonds in terms of GDP, which is low for Italy and Spain (0.3% and 1.1% respectively), and much higher in France (4%) and in Germany (2.3%). 9 These results suggest that the banking sector holdings of government bonds across the EU countries are important. This portfolio structure may have potential relevant consequences on the CDS correlations analyzed in this paper.
Sovereign -bank nexus: within country analysis
The previous analysis suggests that in our data set the unconditional correlations between the daily rates of change of bank and sovereign bond CDS premia tend to vary over time.
The properties of these shifts are investigated here with the help of a sophisticated time-varying conditional correlation procedure. As usual, we show that the selection of the latter is justified by the data. Two preliminary tests for the adequacy of the constant correlation GARCH are performed, tests originally set out by Bollerslev (1990, page 502 ) in a bivariate context. As pointed out by Aslanidis et al. (2010) , they are appropriate for testing against the DCC-GARCH alternative of Engle (2002) and of Tse and Tsui (2002) . The LM test of Tse (2000) and of Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) , discussed in a previous section, is also implemented, where the alternative hypothesis is provided by a STCC-GARCH. The findings, set out in Table 1 , suggest that the null of a CCC-GARCH is mostly rejected when the alternative model is parameterized as a DCC-GARCH and overwhelmingly rejected when the alternative is assumed to be a STCC-GARCH.
<Insert Table 1 about here > 9 See Korte and Steffen (2015, (1')
where, as in equation (6) 
being parameterized by the logistic function (8).
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For each country we tested four transition variables ( ) which are likely to trigger a regime shift. These are ∆GGsp t , the daily change in the spread between the Greek and the German 10 year sovereign bond yield, ∆VIX t , the daily change of the VIX index, ∆cdss t + , the positive daily change in the sovereign CDS, ∆cdsb t + , the positive daily change in the bank CDS. The selection of the proper transition variable and of the associated delay lag d is based on the quality of the estimation fit. In the case of Germany and
France the transition variable is the daily change in the spread between 10 The order of the conditional mean autoregressions is low. ℎ = 1 throughout and = 1 for Spain and Italy, and is equal to 2 and 3 in the case, respectively, of France and of Germany.
the Greek and the German 10 year sovereign bond yields ∆GGsp t , with a lag of 3 and 6 working days, respectively; for Italy the transition variable is the positive daily change in the sovereign CDS, ∆cdss t + with a one day delay; for Spain, in line with the hypothesis that the origin of the crisis is to be ascribed to the fragility of its banking system, the trigger is the positive daily change in the bank CDS, ∆cdsb t + , with a lag of 5 working days.
The conditional correlations and the smooth transition parameters are to be found in Table 2 . Strongly significant from a statistical point of view, they have the appropriate size and the expected sign. 11 Tests on the standardized residuals, obtained using the triangular conditional variance parameterization, fail to detect serial correlation or conditional heteroskedasticity and suggest that the quality of the fit is highly satisfactory. However, since the Jarque-Bera statistics systematically reject the null of normality, the estimates are obtained using the robust QMLE procedure developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) .
< Insert Table 2 about here >
The size of the conditional correlation coefficients ( 12 1 and 12 2 ) is from two to three times larger in the second than in the first regime, with the notable exception of Germany, where the increase is smaller. In the second regime, the transition variable exceeds the estimated threshold value appearing in the logistic model and thus − is positive, whereas in the first regime − is negative.
The speed of adjustment to the shift of the selected transition variable (∆ ) is much higher in France and Germany than in the peripheral countries. It reflects a rise in the risk perception, associated to the domestic banking sector, due to the vagaries of the Greek crisis. Bouts of high correlation correspond to a worsening of the crisis, especially towards the end of the sample when renewed domestic instability, followed by the 11 The full set of mean and variance equations parameters of the GARCH estimates are not reported here for the sake of parsimony and are available from the authors upon request. Italian nexus alone showed signs of loosening and this remarkable result was probably due to domestic policy reasons.
Sovereign -bank nexus: cross country analysis
The sovereign -bank CDS nexus is usually understood to be a within country phenomenon. However, this relationship could also exist across countries of the Euro Zone. Its strength would then be affected by common monetary policy decisions and/or idiosyncratic fiscal shocks.
The relevance of the nexus can be seen as a proxy of the market perception of the overall riskiness of a country (the stronger the nexus, the higher the riskiness and vice-versa). We estimate therefore a VAR and 18). Contrary to common belief, changes in the Italian riskiness perception are to be considered but a contained phenomenon.
13 The STCC-GARCH conditional correlation time series are obtained using the estimates in Table 2 . The VAR order is set to 15, a selection based on the Akaike criterion.
Two additional factors could further reinforce cross border linkages: i) institutions other than the local sovereign can issue guarantees in favor of EMU banks and ii) Basle II allows to weight favorably euro bonds issued by EU sovereigns independently of the effective riskiness of the issuer.
French and German banks will find it profitable, therefore, to buy bonds issued by Italy and Spain whenever their yields are higher than bond yields issued by core countries. Data on the latest stress tests of 2014
show that on average German and French banks hold in their sovereign bond portfolios -besides a share of domestic sovereign bonds of 53% and of 35% respectively -a relatively large share (from 15% to 20%) of peripheral sovereign bonds issued by the "GIIPS". 14 Hence we analyze the pattern of the correlation between the daily rates of change of the CDS premia of German and French banks, respectively, and the rates of change of the Italian and Spanish sovereign CDS premia.
In more detail, we estimate two systems. In the first one, the German bank bond CDS spread rate of change ( ) is related to the Italian The time-varying conditional correlations are given by
where is, as usual, parameterized by the logistic function (8).
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Here too the selection of the STCC-GARCH is justified by the T-S-T LM tests. The model estimates in Table 3 are always highly statistically significant and the standardized residuals tests fail to find evidence of misspecification. An accurate selection process justifies the use of the change in the Greek-German bond spread as transition variable.
<Insert Table 3 following press information leakages on banks' CA and an unanticipated rebound of the Greek crisis due to domestic political instability.
Conclusions
In this paper the nexus between bank and sovereign CDS spread rates of change is analyzed with the help of the STCC-GARCH model of Berben and
Jansen (2005) and of Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) . The selection of the transition variable, which is supposed to bring about a smooth regime switch, proves to be highly informative. In the two core countries of the sample, Germany and France, the transition variable is the change in the spread between the Greek and German long term sovereign bond yields. Notes.*: Ljung Box test statistic of n-th order autocorrelation in the cross-products of the CCC-GARCH standardized residuals, distributed as 2 with n degrees of freedom; **: Bollerslev (1990) residual based F-test of the null of constant conditional correlation distributed as F (n,n.obs-n) where n indicates the number of lags set out in column 2; T-S-T: Tse (2000) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) LM test distributed as a 2 with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom, N being the number of variables of the multivariate GARCH; n.obs: number of observations. Probabilities in square brackets. Notes. T-S-T: Tse (2000) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) LM test distributed as a 2 with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom, N being the number of variables of the multivariate GARCH; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; AR(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time series. Student t in round brackets; probabilities in square brackets; subscript 1 stands for rates of change in the banks CDS premia in Germany or France, depending on the column; subscript 2 stands for rates of change in the Italian sovereign CDS premia; subscript 3 stands for rates of change in the Spanish sovereign CDS premia. Superscript 1 stands for regime 1 (low correlation) and superscript 2 stands for regime 2 (high correlation). Notes. BD = Germany, FR = France; IT = Italy; SP = Spain; D = daily rate of change;  = daily change; Mcor = time varying correlation moving average, computed over a 25-day time window; cdss: sovereign sector credit default spread (premium); cdsb: banking sector credit default spread (premium); GGsp: spread between Greek and German 10 years government bond yields; VIX: S&P100 index volatility Index; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; AR(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; probabilities in square brackets. 
